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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P I a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
- v -
JAMES HILL and LARRY HILL, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 20978 
STATEMENT QF ISSUES PRESENTED QN APPEAL 
The f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s a p p e a l : 
1. Was the evidence suf f ic ien t to support the j u r y ' s 
finding tha t both defendant James Hil l was gui l ty of burglary? 
2 . Was t h e e v i d e n c e s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t t h e j u r y ' s 
f i n d i n g t h a t bo th d e f e n d a n t s w e r e g u i l t y of second d e g r e e f e l o n y 
t h e f t ? 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
D e f e n d a n t s , James H i l l and L a r r y H i l l , were c h a r g e d by 
i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h b u r g l a r y , a t h i r d d e g r e e f e l o n y , under UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 7 6 - 6 - 2 0 2 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , and t h e f t , a second d e g r e e f e l o n y , under 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76 -6 -404 and -412 (1978) (R. 3 ) . They were 
o r i g i n a l l y t r i e d on A p r i l 8 and 9 , 1985 and found g u i l t y of 
b u r g l a r y and t h i r d d e g r e e f e l o n y t h e f t (R. 4 6 - 9 , 5 0 - 9 ) . However, 
t h e t r i a l c o u r t g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t s ' mot ion f o r a new t r i a l , and 
t h e y were t r i e d a g a i n on Augus t 29 and 3 0 , 1985 (R. 2 0 8 , 1 6 2 - 8 ) . 
At t h i s l a t t e r t r i a l , a j u r y found James H i l l g u i l t y of bo th 
c h a r g e s and L a r r y H i l l g u i l t y o n l y of t h e f t (R. 1 6 9 - 7 2 ) . 
The t r i a l c o u r t sen tenced James H i l l to terms of 0-5 
y e a r s and 1-15 y e a r s i n t h e Utah S t a t e P r i son and f ined him 
$5,000 and $10,000 for t h e bu rg la ry and t h e f t c o n v i c t i o n s . The 
cour t suspended those sen tences and a l l but $2,500 of t h e f i n e s 
and p laced him on e i g h t e e n months ' p r o b a t i o n , a cond i t i on of 
which was t h a t defendant serve concur ren t terms of one year i n 
t h e Sanpete County J a i l and pay t h e remaining f i n e of $2,500. 
Defendant was f u r t h e r ordered t o make r e s t i t u t i o n in the amount 
of $1,878 to t h e v i c t i m , Mt. P l ea san t Antique Shop (R. 1 8 3 - 4 ) . 
The cour t sentenced Larry H i l l t o a term of 1-15 y e a r s 
in t h e Utah S t a t e P r i son and f i n e d him $10,000 for t h e t h e f t 
c o n v i c t i o n , but suspended t h a t sen tence and a l l but $1,500 of t h e 
f i n e and p laced defendant on e i g h t e e n months" p r o b a t i o n , a 
c o n d i t i o n of which was t h a t he serve a term of one year in t h e 
Sanpete County J a i l and pay t h e remaining f i n e of $1,500. 
Defendant was a l so ordered t o make r e s t i t u t i o n , in conjunct ion 
with h i s co-defendant , to t h e v i c t i m (R. 1 8 7 - 7 ) . 
The cour t then gran ted defendants 1 a p p l i c a t i o n for a 
c e r t i f i c a t e of p robab le cause and r e l e a s e d them on t h e i r own 
recognizance pending r e s o l u t i o n of t h e i r appeal i n t h i s Court 
(R. 182) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 29 , 1984 a t approximate ly 5:00 p .m. , defendants 
James and Larry H i l l (who were f a t h e r and son r e s p e c t i v e l y ) , 
e n t e r e d t h e Mt. P l ea san t Antique Shop l o c a t e d in Mt. P l e a s a n t , 
Utah. An owner of the shop, Sue Sego, showed t o and d i scussed 
with James numerous i t ems , i nc lud ing s e v e r a l smal le r p i e c e s 
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contained in a g lass case, an Indian bowlf and an antique rocking 
chair (T. 89-91). Three cap ta in ' s cha i r s , which were for sale 
and located on the shop's front porch and inside the shop, were 
readi ly v i s i b l e to anyone enter ing and walking through the s tore 
(T. 94-5) . After browsing for 35 to 45 minutes, defendants l e f t . 
There being no other customers, Ms. Sego placed the chairs t ha t 
were on the porch inside and closed the shop for the day (R. 93, 
100-1). 
When Ms. Sego returned to the shop l a t e the next 
morning, she discovered tha t a l l of the items tha t James had 
examined the day before were missing, namely the antique rocker, 
the pieces from the glass case, the Indian bowl, and a tureen. 
The three cap ta in ' s cha i r s , as well as other items not 
spec i f i ca l ly examined by James, were also missing (R. 103-7). A 
police inves t iga t ion revealed tha t entry to the shop had been 
made through a back door (R. 166). Ear l ier that same morning, 
defendant Larry Hi l l purchased gas for h is white van a t a s t a t ion 
in Mt. Pleasant and indicated to the at tendant tha t he and his 
father were in a hurry to return to t h e i r home in Oregon. All 
the van ' s windows, except for the windshield, were covered with 
black "Visqueen," making i t d i f f i c u l t to see inside (T. 203-5). 
Several days l a t e r , af ter receiving a request from the 
Mt. Pleasant Police Department to a s s i s t in a burglary and thef t 
inves t iga t ion , a police off icer in Canyonville, Oregon, where 
both defendants l ived and James Hi l l ran an antique s to re , 
located and seized during the execution of search warrants on a 
white van in Larry H i l l ' s possession and on defendants' 
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residences the rocking chair and the three cap t a in ' s chairs t h a t 
were missing from the Mt. Pleasant Antique Shop. James Hil l 
offered the off icer a receipt as proof of his ownership of one of 
the chai rs seized; however, the rece ip t did not appear to be 
v a l i d . Neither James nor Larry gave any other explanation for 
possession of the property (T. 131-40). 
In an interview with a police off icer pr ior to 
defendants1 t r i a l f Bruce Blackf a res ident of Mt. Pleasant f 
indicated t h a t a Dave Hall had committed the burglary at the 
antique shop. However, he made reference to defendants1 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the loading of some of the s to len property into 
t h e i r vanf and suggested that defendants were involved in the 
burglary (R. 183-9) . Black also admitted to s e l l i ng to a local 
junk dealer a doll taken from the shop and given to him by Hall 
to dispose of (T. 172, 189-90). 
At t r i a l , Ms. Sego t e s t i f i e d t h a t the t o t a l value of 
the items missing from her shop was $1,871 (T. 111). Don 
J e f f e r i e s , the co-owner of Mt. Pleasant Antique Shop, t e s t i f i e d 
tha t the rocking chair and cap ta in ' s chairs found in defendants ' 
possession were worth a t o t a l of between $295 and $310 (T. 161-
3) . An antique dealer offered a s imilar estimate of 
approximately $26 0 (T. 153-6). 
The t r i a l court gave the jury ins t ruc t ions on two 
va r i a t i ons of thef t ( theft (UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (1978) and 
thef t by receiving (UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-408 (1978); Ins t ruc t ion 
Nos. 8, 10; R. 141, 143), on burglary (UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 
(1978); Ins t ruc t ion No. 8; R. 141), and on "aiding and abet t ing" 
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(UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 (1978); Instruction No. 13; R. 146) .1 
The jury found James Hill guilty of both burglary and theft, and 
Larry Hill guilty only of theft (R. 169-72). 
1
 Section 76-2-202 provides: 
Every personf acting with the mental 
state required for the commission of an 
offense who directly commits the offensef who 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to engage 
in conduct which constitutes an offense shall 
be criminally liable as a party for such 
conduct. 
Section 76-6-202 provides: 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he 
enters or remains unlawfully in a building or 
any portion of a building with intent to 
commit a felony or theft or commit an assault 
on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third 
degree unless it was committed in a dwelling, 
in which event it is a felony of the second 
degree. 
Section 76-6-40 4 provides: 
A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to deprive 
him thereof. 
Section 76-6-408 states in pertinent part: 
(1) A person commits theft if he 
receives, retains, or disposes of the 
property of another knowing that it has been 
stolen, or believing that it probably has 
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, 
withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or 
withholding any such property from the owner, 
knowing the property to be stolen, with a 
purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
S u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e was p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l t o s u p p o r t 
d e f e n d a n t s 1 c o n v i c t i o n s . D e f e n d a n t s 1 u n s a t i s f a c t o r i l y e x p l a i n e d 
p o s s e s s i o n of p r o p e r t y r e c e n t l y s t o l e n from t h e a n t i q u e s h o p , 
c o u p l e d w i t h o t h e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s , p r o v i d e d an a d e q u a t e b a s i s upon 
which t h e j u r y c o u l d h a v e found them g u i l t y of b u r g l a r y and 
t h e f t . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED AT TRIAL TO 
SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICTS. 
D e f e n d a n t s a r g u e t h a t t h e S t a t e p r e s e n t e d i n s u f f i c i e n t 
evidence at trial to support their convictions* When considering 
a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, t h i s Court has 
applied the following standard of review: 
This Court wi l l not l i g h t l y overturn the 
f indings of a ju ry . We must view the 
evidence properly presented a t t r i ed in the 
l i g h t most favorable to the j u r y ' s ve rd i c t , 
and wi l l only i n t e r f e r e when the evidence i s 
so lacking and insubs tan t i a l tha t a 
reasonable man could not possibly have 
reached a verd ic t beyond a reasonable doubt. 
We also view in a l i g h t most favorable to the j u r y ' s verd ic t those fac t s which can be 
reasonably inferred from the evidence 
presented to i t . 
S ta te v, McCardell. 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982) ( c i t a t i ons 
omit ted) . As noted in S ta te v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985): 
In reviewing the conviction, we do not 
s u b s t i t u t e our judgment for tha t of the ju ry . "I t i s the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and to determine 
the c r e d i b i l i t y of the witnesses . . . . n 
S t a t e v . Lamm, U t a h , 606 P .2d 2 2 9 , 231 
(19800) ; . angojLd S t a t e v . L i n d e n , U tah , 657 
P .2d 1 3 6 4 , 1366 ( 1 9 8 3 3 ) . So l o n g a s t h e r e i s 
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some evidence, including reasonable 
inferences, from which findings of all the 
requisite elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops. 
Id. at 345 (citation omitted)• And, even if the Court views the 
evidence as less than wholly conclusive, or if contradictory 
evidence or conflicting inferences exist, the verdict should be 
upheld. State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982). In short, 
"on conflicting evidence the Court is obliged to accept the 
version of the facts which supports the verdict." State v. 
Isaacson, 704 P.2d 555, 556 (Utah 1985), citing State v. Howell. 
649 P.2d at 93. 
Under these standards, the Sta te presented suf f ic ien t 
evidence to support James Hill's convictions of burglary and 
second degree felony t h e f t . 2 The jury could have reasonably 
concluded tha t he was gui l ty of those crimes, given tha t he was 
in the antique shop the evening before the burglary and thef t 
were committed, had examined many of the items tha t were 
subsequently found missing, was apparently in a hurry to return 
to h i s home in Oregon from Mt. Pleasant the morning after the 
crimes, was in unsa t i s f ac to r i ly explained possession of one of 
the s tolen items several days l a t e r , and was connected with the 
2
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-412 (1978) provides in per t inent pa r t : 
(1) Theft of property and services as 
provided in t h i s chapter shal l be punishable 
as follows: 
(a) As a felony of the second degree 
i f 2 
(i) The value of the property or 
services exceeds $1,000[.] 
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crimes through the testimony of Bruce Black. See State v. Asay. 
631 P.2d 861, 863 (Utah 1981) (recognizing the p r inc ip le tha t a 
jury may conclude t h a t one in possession of recently s to len 
property who f a i l s to give a sa t i s f ac to ry explanation of tha t 
possession i s the party gui l ty of the t h e f t ) ; S ta te v. Sessions . 
583 P.2d 44, 45-6 (Utah 1978) (noting tha t "possession of 
a r t i c l e s recent ly s tolen f when coupled with circumstances 
incons i s ten t with innocencef such as . . . making a fa lse or 
improbable or unsat is factory explanation of the possess ion may 
be su f f i c i en t to connect the possessor with the offense of 
burglary and j u s t i f y his conviction of i t " ) . 3 ££. State v. 
6
 Although defendants did not object to Jury Ins t ruc t ion No. 14 
a t t r i a l (T. 212-16) and do not make i t an issue on appeal, the 
Sta te must concede t h a t tha t i n s t ruc t ion appears to v i o l a t e both 
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979)f and Francis v. 
Franklin, U.S. , 105 S.Ct. 1965 (1985). £££ State v. 
Chambers, 709 P.2d 321, 325-7 (Utah 1985). That i n s t ruc t i on 
s t a t e d : 
I instruct you that in regards to the 
Count of Theft that there is a presumption 
that possession of property recently stolen, 
when no satisfactory explanation of such 
possession is made, shall be deemed prima 
facie evidence that the person in possession 
stole the property. 
I further instruct you that it is a 
defense to this presumption and the charge of 
theft if you find from the evidence that 
defendants 
a. Acted under an honest claim of right 
to the property or service involved, or 
b. Acted in an honest belief that he 
had the right to obtain or exercise control 
over the property as he did. 
(R. 147). On the other hand, Jury Instruction No. 16, which 
stated that "[ylou are instructed that as to the offense of 
Ib]urglary that proof of possession of recently stolen property 
is a circumstance that you may consider in connection with all 
other evidence in .determining the guilt or innocence of the 
[d]efendants" (R. 1'49), was a permissible instruction. 
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£i£i£f 27 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 7 (1986). The jury could have found 
him guilty under either a theory of direct commission of the 
offenses or one of "solicit ting], request[ing], command ting], 
encouragfingl , or intentionally aid[ing] another person" in the 
commission of those offenses. i&£ § 76-2-202; Instruction No. 13 
(R. 146); State v. Clayton. 646 P.2d 723f 725 (Utah 1982) 
(circumstantial evidence alone may be competent to establish the 
guilt of the accused); State v. Gellatly. 22 Utah 2d 149, 151, 
449 P.2d 993, 995 (1969) (holding that a conviction for theft may 
be upheld although the State has not presented "any direct proof 
identifying defendant as the thief or directly connecting him 
with a felonious taking or asportation"). And, contrary to the 
suggestion otherwise in defendants1 brief, it was for the jury to 
decide whether James1s explanation for possession of the stolen 
property was satisfactory or unsatisfactory. £&£ Aaa^f 631 P.2d 
at 863. 
Furthermore, the jury could have reasonably determined 
that James Hill was responsible for the theft of all the property 
missing from the antique shop, thereby making him guilty of 
second degree felony theft. Uncontroverted testimony by Ms. Sego 
at trial established that the stolen items were worth a total of 
$1,871. £££ State v. Purcell, 711 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 1985) 
(noting that "because an owner is presumed to be familiar with 
the value of his possessions, an owner is competent to testify on 
the present market value of his property"). Simply because all 
of the stolen property was not found in defendant's possession 
would not prohibit a finding that he stole all of it. £££ State 
-9-
Vt PachegQr 13 Utah 2d 148, 150, 369 P.2d 494, 495 (1962) ("Proof 
of larceny does not require a showing that the accused be in 
possession of the property stolen."); State v. Bradford, 683 P.2d 
924, 930 (Mont. 1984). 
Similarly, there was sufficient evidence to support 
Larry Hillfs conviction of second degree felony theft. The jury 
could have reasonably concluded that he was guilty of that crime 
based on the following evidence adduced at trial: his presence 
in the antique store with his father the evening before the 
burglary and theft, his comment to a gas station attendant in Mt. 
Pleasant the morning following the crimes that he and his father 
were in a hurry to return home to Oregon, his unexplained 
possession of items stolen from the antique shop, and the 
testimony of Bruce Black that connected him and his father with 
the crimes. Such a conclusion was justified under either a 
theory of direct commission of the offense or one of "aiding and 
abetting." See § 76-2-202; Instruction No. 13 (R. 146). Again, 
simply because all of the items taken from the antique shop were 
not found in his possession did not prohibit a finding that he 
was guilty of second degree felony theft, and not some lesser 
degree of theft. jj££ Pacheco. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendants' 
sufficiency of evidence claims are without merit. Therefore, 
their convictions should be affirmed. 
-10-
Respectfully submitted this day of February, 
1986 . 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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